MOOT, MOCK AND DEBATE SOCIETY FRIDAY SPECIAL: UNCOVERING THE COMPLEXITY; EXAMINING THE VARIOUS RULES OF INTERPRETATION UNDER NIGERIAN LEGAL SYSTEM

   In 1748, the French philosopher, Baron de Montesquieu, in slight opposition to the postulation of John Locke as to how powers are to be shared among the governmental powers; propounded the doctrine of “Separation of Power”- wherein the legislature makes the law, the executive enforces the law, and the judiciary interprets the law. 

The focus here shall be on the process, technique, and style of interpretation of laws under the Nigerian legal system. The interpretation of laws is important as it leads to the protection of the rights and liberties of the governed and provides guard rails for the governmental powers to check and mitigate excesses. The writer, Antonin Scalia in her book, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS, put these words down, “In 1905, the Supreme Court of the United States applied the rule to the country’s founding document: ‘The Constitution is a written instrument. As such, its meaning does not alter’. That which it meant when adopted, it means”. This is why the job of judges become onerous and searing as they are to, although not being the makers, to interpret the law as the law makers and framers intended.

To achieve this, they implore various mechanisms and technique fondly called “Canons of Interpretation”. Canons of Interpretation are the tools that judges implore to help them to read meaning to the letters, spirits, and intendment of a statute or the Constitution. They include, but are not limited to, the following: Literal Rule, Mischief Rule, Purposive, Golden Rule, Noscitur a sociis rule and the Ejusdem Generis Rule.

LITERAL RULE

This is the foremost and the premier of all the rules or canons of interpretation and has its origin etched in history as far back as the common law.

      The rule contemplates that the words in a statute should be given their ordinary meaning and nothing more, as the same contains the true intention of the law makers. This rule barricades the Court from inferring any meaning other than the ordinary and literal meaning of the word, such have been applied by great jurists, such as Tridal, CJ in the case of Sussex Peerage (1844) 11 Clark amd Finnelly 85, 8 ER 1034.

This rule does not allow a judge to import any other meaning to the statute even if the Court feels that same ought to be done to avoid certain consequences. “It is not the duty of the Judge to interpret a statute to avoid its consequence. The consequences of a statute are those of the legislature, not the judge. A Judge who regiments himself to the consequences of a statute is moving outside the domain of statutory interpretation”, these were the words of the Nigerian Supreme Court in the case of IFEANYI v INEC (2024) 10 NWLR [PT. 1946] 243. 

Under this Canon, the only instance where this will not be applied will be when the words are ambiguous. In the case of ISA v INEC (2024) 7 NWLR [PT. 1935] 159 SC, it was held that: “The Court will not embark on a voyage of discovery. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, as in the instant case, the Supreme Court will follow the literal rule of interpretation.” The aforementioned case is in harmony with the judicial authority that, “Where the ordinary and plain meaning of words used are clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to those words in their natural and ordinary meaning and literal sense without resorting to an intrinsic aid” in the case of NWOBIKE  v FRN (2022) 6 NWLR [1826] 293. The Court went further to hold that:

“The literal rule of interpretation is the oldest rule and is followed by judges all over the world. The rationale behind the literal rule is that it prevents Courts from making biased decisions when the issue relates to sensitive ad political matters by sticking to the dictionary meaning without discretion, expansion or contraction of the words used in the statute”.

THE MISCHIEF RULE

This rule is one that asks two important questions; “What was the law before the Act? What defect did the new law seek to address?” The Court then looks at the mischief, lacuna, or defect the new law seeks to cure and proceed to interpret and apply it to cure the mischief. In FRN v AKAEZE (2024) 12 NWLR [PT. 1951] SC it was defined that: “One of the fundamental guidelines to interpretation of statutes is the mischief rule, which considers the state of the law prior to the enactment, the defect which the statute set to eradicate or prevent, the remedy adopted by the legislature to cure the mischief, and the actual reason behind the remedy.” 

THE GOLDEN RULE

This is a complimentary or an ancillary rule to the literal rule and serves as a defence mechanism to its lacuna hidden in the crevices of the rule. According to this rule, it gives judges the lee way to give meaning to words of a statute in concurrence with the intention of the lawmakers.  The golden rule is deployed when judges encounter a grammatical road block on the journey of the application of the Literal Rule, in the form of ambiguity, absurdity, uncertainty, and inapplicability 

Making recourse to history shows that the golden rule was first formulated by the Court in the case of   BECKE v SMITH (1936) 2 M & W 191, the Court in its wisdom opined that, in certain instances it would become of utmost important to modify the words in statutes to in bid to make the law unambiguous, clear and applicable. The ambiguity occurs when the law is inapplicable or contradicts a principle of law of the same law. 

In EDOSACA v OSAKUE (2018) 16 NWLR [PT. 1645] CA it was established that: “The golden rule of interpretation of statutes is that the plain words in a statute attract, and should be given, their natural and ordinary grammatical meaning, unless such literal meaning will lead to absurdity”. In the same light, in ADISA v OYINWOLA (2000) 10 NWLR [PT. 674] 116 SC, it was held that: “The rule of construction is to intend the legislature to have meant what they actually expressed”. These words summarize the import of the golden rule.

THE PURPOSIVE RULE

  The purposive or progressive rule of interpretation involves the consideration of the following factors: “(i) the language of the provision; (ii) the context in which the language is used; and (iii) The purpose of the legislation or statutory scheme in which the language is used” see the case of NWOBIKE v FRN (supra).

It is important to state that the apex Court employs this canon the most, especially when it comes to constitutional confusion.  In the case on the local government autonomy, AGF v AG of ABIA & 35 ORS with suit number- SC/CV/343/2024 held on page 39 of judgement  that: “Therefore, the Constitution must be applied in such a matter as not to defeat its intention or purpose. Where the application of the Constitution, the Court is not bound not to apply it in such a manner and rather adopt an application that would result in the achievement of the intention or purpose. See also KALU v STATE (1998) 13 NWLR [PT. 583] 531, FRN v NGANJIWA (2022) 17 NWLR [PT. 1860] 407.” The Supreme Court went on to hold that on page 41 of judgment that: “The purposive and teleological approach requires the Court not to remain fixated on the literal and narrow meaning of the words used in the Constitution or statute in the situations mentioned above in disregard of the intention or purpose of the provisions, but go on to give the words a meaning that accords with the purpose and intention behind the words”.

NOSCITUR A SOCIIS RULE

The Latin term “noscitur a sociis” translates to “known by its associates”. The rule is usually used in contract, statutes, and in the construction of some documents when the meaning of a word or words are in dispute; and the word can not be construed in isolation. 

The Court in ANYAKORA v OBIAKOR (1990) 2 NWLR [PT. 130] 52 held that: “Under the Noscitur a sociis rule of constructions, the obscurity or doubt in any particular word may be removed by reference to the associated words, and the meaning of a term may be enlarged or restricted by referring to the object of the whole clause in which it is used.”  See also OKEKE v AG ANAMBRA STATE (1992) 1 NWLR [PT. 215] 60 CA.

EJUSDEM GENERIS RULE

On the other hand, ‘ejusdem generis’ is a Latin word which means, ‘of the same kind’. The rule in a nutshell involves interpreting the provisions of a statute, general words that follow particular and specific words of the same nature as themselves, and take their meaning from these specific words.

Going by the case in OKEWU v FRN (2012) 9 NWLR [PT. 1305) 327 SC held that: “The ejusdem generis rule of the statutory interpretation is to the effect that general words which follow enumerated particular classes of things are constructed as applying only to things of the same general class as those enumerated.”

Conclusively, the Court or the Judge, in his wisdom and judicial creativity, employs the adequate canon of interpretation based on the statute, as it is not a ‘one-size-fits-all” thing. The law in dispute determines the canon or approach to deploy. Also, note that in interpreting the fons et origo, which is the Constitution, a special and particular is employed, see the case of RHODES-VIVOUR v INEC (2024) 10 NWLR [PT. 1945] 47 SC.